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For some time now there has been extensive discussion on the role of
species membership in determining an individual's moral status. Some,
most prominently Peter Singer, have argued that to base a moral
determination on species membership amounts to speciesism - "a
prejudice or attitude of bias toward the interests of members of one's own
species and against those of members of other species" 1 - and that this is as
arbitrary, unjustified and morally repugnant as racism or sexism. Others,
most commonly conservative Christian thinkers, have argued that human
beings obviously have greater moral status than animals and have thus
defended the concept of speciesism as morally acceptable.
It is my position that philosophers like Singer are quite correct in that
membership in a species is morally insignificant and that Singer's
opponents ought not to argue against this fact. Rather, what they ought to
say is that human beings have greater moral status, not because we are
members of the species "Homo sapiens" but because of other, more
significant factors; namely that we are designed to have proper functions
that confer on us an extremely high moral status.
To begin with, let us examine the concept of "species" to see why it
is not helpful in determining moral status.
Problems with "Species"

The concept "species" is extremely problematic if used to determine
moral status. To begin with, it is not entirely clear that "species" can be
understood properly as anything other than a class that can be reduced to a
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historic "individuaF Also, there are several different ways of classifying
species\ and thus it seems that it is entirely conceivable that a given
individual could be considered a member of more than one distinct species
simultaneously, and could thus have vastly different moral standings
simultaneously. Finally, in some cases it seems that contemporary
evolutionary biology can't rule out that a human individual might be able
to become a member of a new and different species and yet remain
unchanged in any sense that seems to have moral significance. Let us then
examine these arguments individually.

History of Origin
In his article, A Matter of Individuality, David Hull makes some
interesting statements about the concept of "species" that are particularly
relevant to my argument. He explains that "species" have generally been
understood as "spatiotemporally unrestricted classes," but his position is
that this understanding is false. Rather, he argues that "species" are
actually "spatiotemporally localized individuals, historic entities".
The point is that "species" are historically localized things. Hull
explains: "If a species evolved which was identical to a species of extinct
pterodactyl save origin, it would still be a new, distinct species,"4 a claim,
he points out, that is entirely consistent with, and in fact seems to emerge
from Darwinian Theory.
It is metaphysically possible for there to be another planet on the
other side of the universe that is in every way, shape, and form identical to
the planet on which we live. On this planet there could exist beings that in
no way, shape, or form differ from you or me, other than their historical
origin and present reproductive community -let's assume that they could
reproduce with us if we came in contact. These creatures would be human
beings, indistinguishable from us, but would not be members of the species
Homo sapiens. It seems incorrect to say that other individuals, who are in
every way indistinguishable from you and me, have a lesser moral status
because the history of their origin is not the same as ours. Yet a speciesist
position would have to claim that very thing.

Multiplicity
In his article, Species, Philip Kitcher lists several definitions of
"species", given by various scholars. Mayr's view is: "species are groups
of interbreeding natural populations that are reproductively isolated from
other such groups." 5 Simpson, Hennig, and Wiley hold the view that
species are: "the set of organisms in a lineage (a sequence of ancestraldescendant populations) bounded by successive speciation events."6
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Simpson qualifies this by claiming: "Speciation events themselves can be
understood either as events in which a descendant population becomes
reproductively isolated from its ancestors." 7 Or, as Hennig and Wiley add:
"as events in which an ancestral population gives rise to two descendant
populations which are reproductively isolated from one another." 8 The
view of van Valen with regard to speciation is that it is: "a process in which
descendant populations are ecologically differentiated from their
ancestors." 9 Sokal and Sneath argued that this classification ought to be
done by: "dividing organisms into species by constructing a measure of
overall similarity and taking species to be sets of organisms which are
clustered by this measure." 10 And others, such as Nelson and Platnick, have
argued that: "a species is a set of organisms distinguished by their common
possession of a 'minimal evolutionary novelty' ." ''
It would appear that there are a rather large number of ways of
categorizing and understanding "species". Kitcher, however, is not dismayed
by the many different options. He insists that "species" are real things that
exist in the world. However, he claims that there are legitimately many
possible ways to classify species. He contends that this plurality is based
on the diversity of the aims of categorization. Thus, it is entirely acceptable
for there to be different c1iterion and still such a thing as species. He writes:
"There are many different contexts of investigation in which the concept of
species is employed, and ... the currently favored set of species taxa has
emerged through a history in which different groups of organisms have
been classified by biologists working on different biological problems.'' 12
While Kitcher's view is all well and good with respect to embracing
diversity and might be pragmatically acceptable to a wide range of
biologists, this view offers no help for those who would like to use species
membership as a criterion for determining an individual's moral status. If
Kitcher is correct, then it is entirely possible that a given organism could be
classified as species A under one classification system and classified as
species B under another. If a given individual can legitimately be classified
in a multiplicity of species simultaneously and species membership is the
basis of moral status, then a given individual can have a multiplicity
different moral statuses simultaneously. This raises the possibility of an
individual being having an extremely high moral status under one standard
while having a lesser moral status under a different standard,
simultaneously. It seems counterintuitive that a single individual could
have both a high and a low moral status, simultaneously.
If Kitcher's view is correct, it shows that the concept "species" is
extremely messy. It is entirely unclear and unlikely that this understanding
of "species" can help us to determine an individual's moral status. Thus,
"species" remains a serious problem.
May, 2007

147

Reproductive Community
Finally, assuming that we can ever come up with a good definition of
"species" - though clearly historical origin and reproductive community
would be involved- there are still serious problems with grounding moral
status on species. Let's suppose that there is a terrorist attack on New York
City such that the entire population of the city is exposed to a mutating
chemical. This chemical changes the reproductive capacity of any human
being who comes in contact with it such that that individual can only
reproduce with other individuals who have been in contact with the
chemical and that this trait is inherited by all of their offspring. It looks like
we would have an entirely new species in New York City that- other than
reproductively- would be indistinguishable from the species Homo sapiens.
While a biologist might not see a problem with this, it would be extremely
problematic if moral status is determined by species membership. Are the
members of the new species importantly different from members of Homo
sapiens? Only their reproductive community has changed so I'm not sure
why they would be. And yet a speciesist would have to claim that they do not
necessarily possess the same moral status as members of Homo sapiens.
Thus it seems that philosophers such as Peter Singer, who claim that
determining moral status based merely upon species membership is entirely
irrational, are con·ect. It seems untenable to claim that one's reproductive
community and historical origin are the basis of one's high moral status. Yet,
many thinkers have the strong intuition that human beings have an extremely
greater moral status than chimpanzees, dolphins or dogs. Is this view
speciesism- a clearly itTational position- or is it based on something more?

Characteristically Human Functions
It might be argued that the special moral status of human beings is
based on the manifestation of characteristically human functions, such as
rationality and will. This line of argumentation might work when we are
discussing normal, healthy, adult human beings. This, however, does not
actually accomplish that which those opposed to Singer's view ultimately
wish to accomplish. Singer argues that this line of reasoning is a very good
argument for saying why some animals have a higher moral status than
some human beings. 13
Singer, along with many other philosophers, argues that infants especially those still in the womb - and retarded human beings, do not
actually possess these characteristically human traits, or at least do not
possess these traits at a superior level of development to chimpanzees, dogs or
several other animals all of whom seem to have at least some ability to
utilize rational thought and to will. Therefore, these philosophers would
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argue that claiming that an infant or mentally retarded adult has a higher
moral status than these animals cannot be based on the possession of these
traits, but rather on speciesism. If one actually wants to base a detennination of
moral status on these traits one must agree that these animals have a higher
moral status than human infants and mentally retarded human beings.
The problem is that those who argue that human beings always have
greater moral status will not accept an argument that entails a chimpanzee
having a higher moral status than a human infant. Confused on how to
proceed, they turn to a defense of speciesism in an attempt to salvage their
intuitions. This, however, is not the correct answer to this problem. It is
true that human beings always have a greater moral status than animals but
it is not because of the manifestation of characteristically human traits or
because of our membership in the species Homo sapiens.

Personhood
A central element to this discussion lies in the concept of "personhood"
and the moral value attached to it. Countless philosophers base their
determination of"personhood" (and the moral value that goes along with it) on
things that an individual does - or is perhaps physically capable of doing.
Usually, the determination has something to do with the manifestation of
cognitive abilities and of abilities to act or will. It is my view that to take up
this method of determining "personhood" is to confuse that which a thing
is with that which that sort of thing characteristically does. A "person" is a
substance that characteristically has certain powers -for example: will and
intellect. However, even if these powers are merely metaphysically potential
to the substance and never actually manifest or have not yet manifest, all that
would mean is that that person is in a piivative condition- something that
ought to be there (i.e.: these powers) was absent- not that it wasn't a person.
It is also extremely important to understand what is meant by other
terms frequently used in this discussion. By "human being" I mean an
individual being who is genetically like myself and the reader - a being
that has "human" DNA - who can survive even if our species changed
through reproductive mutation, or isolation. Incidentally, at this time and to
the best of our knowledge, this group of individuals coincides with the
things we generally classify as "Homo sapiens" but, as I have explained,
this is not metaphysically necessary. 14
We ought to treat infants - in and out of the womb - those with
Alzheimer's disease, the mentally retarded, etc. as persons, even though
they have not yet, no longer, or physically may never have manifest the
traits typically associated with "personhood" and even though their claim
to possession of these traits is only rooted in the fact that they are human
beings, not in the probability - or even the physical possibility - of these
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traits ever being manifest. 15 It is my contention that the sort of thing that a
human being is necessarily entails personhood - though not all persons are
human beings 16 - whether or not the individual human being has
developed enough to manifest "personhood traits" and whether or not the
individual human being has some disorder that has caused these traits to
not/no longer be manifest. 17 In addition to this, it is my view that "personhood"
carries with it the highest moral status. Thus, the state of being a human being
-irrespective of developmental state or the presence of privations -carries
with it the highest rights to protection and responsibilities for us to aid this
individual, simply because of the sort of things that human beings are.
If this high moral status has nothing to do with species membership,
nor with the manifestation of specific traits, what then can we say gives human
persons this extremely high moral status? The answer is quite simple.

The Necessity of Divine Design
In chapter eleven of his book, Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin
Plantinga explores the question of whether a naturalist account can ever
give a satisfactory account of proper function - another way of saying
"characteristic function." After exploring some of the most philosophically
important attempts, he comes to the conclusion that in order to have a
naturalist epistemology we must adopt a supernatural ontology.
First of all, Plantinga addresses Pollock's position that something is
functioning normally if it functions in the way it does most of the time the "usual way". He counters this position with a litany of conditions -like
elderly carpenters with missing fingers, sperm that fail to fertilize an egg,
or baby turtles that do not reach adulthood- all of which, though statistically
more common, can't be seen as proper functions of the individuals involved.
Secondly, Plantinga addresses Millikan's position that proper
function has to do with powers that account for the individual's survival or
the survival of its ancestors. He begins by answering that it is not necessary
for a thing to have ancestors for it to have a proper function; it seems clear
that Adam's heart had a function even though he was the first man. Then he
goes on to explain that just because a trait contributes to an individual's
survival does not mean that the trait is a proper function. He illustrates this
point with a story about an evil leader inducing a mutation that causes pain
and dramatically reduced sight in a sub-set of a racial minority and then
killing the rest of that minority. The pain in the afflicted individuals is so
great as to not only impair their sight but also to impair their cognitive
function dramatically. It seems clear that those with the mutation survived
because of it but it also seems that it is a mistake to say that their eyes are
functioning properly in this condition. However, an evolutionary account
would have to say that such a condition is a proper function in these
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individuals, given that possession this trait enabled the individual to
survive and have offspring. Thus it would be irrational to treat such a
condition, which seems extremely counter-intuitive.
Plantinga concludes by stating: "If, as it looks, it is in fact impossible
to give an account of function in naturalistic terms, then metaphysical
naturalism and naturalist epistemology are at best uneasy bedfellows. The
right way to be a naturalist in epistemology is to be a super-naturalist in
metaphysics. 18
The point that Plantinga is trying to make here is that if we are to
salvage our notion of proper function in things, which seems not only
obvious to our general intuitions but absolutely necessary for any cogent
notion of health and disease let alone the majority of natural science, then
we have to have an ontology that includes a supematural, intelligent designer. 19
This solution may be the only way to salvage our intuitions that
human infants, Alzheimer's patients, mentally retarded human beings etc.
have higher moral status than chimpanzees, dolphins, dogs or other
animals. It seems obvious that if one is in a burning building and has to
choose between saving a mentally retarded human being and a
chimpanzee, one ought to save the mentally retarded human being, even if
the chimpanzee has manifest more "personhood traits" than the mentally
retarded human being. Most would consider it immoral to allow the mentally
retarded human being to die while saving the chimpanzee. Therefore, it seems
that we must appeal to some notion of design to remain true to our
intuitions. The problem is that when we discuss a design, we imply some
sort of designer. But, if Plantinga is correct, then our problem is solved.
If proper function and moral status are not determined by species
classification - which seems dangerously close to arbitrary -but rather by
a designer, namely God, then we have our solution. The category in
question is "Human being " rather than "Homo sapiens ". Only coincidentally
do these categories currently share the same members -to the best of our
knowledge - at the present time, but this need not be the case. God could
create another group of human beings, on a different planet, who would be
identical to the human beings on Earth with the exception of the history of
their origin. These two groups would both be human beings but only the
human beings that originated on Earth would be Homo sapiens.
God designed things to function in certain ways. We can generally
observe the evidence of this in that while the naturalistic categories fail,
groups still seem to function in consistent ways. This is why our intuition is
such that if something deviates from this norm, it is dysfunctional or has a
privation.
This norm is not statistical, by any means. Let's suppose that all of a
sudden, every human being had only one leg and all of our future offspring
had only one leg. A universal condition like this is a problem for a species
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membership-based account of health because it would be hard to say that
this was dysfunctional once a certain number of members of the species
had the trait. For the Divine design account, there is no problem. Yes, our
intuitions are correct and there is something wrong with this situation, not
because it deviates from the species norm, but because it deviates from the
norm of God's design. So, even if nearly everyone was dysfunctional, that
would not thereby make the dysfunctional functional nor would it make
the functional dysfunctional.
This also solves another serious problem in the philosophical
discourse on personhood. As I explained earlier, "personhood" is generally
identified with the manifestation of specific traits - the most common is
rationality. The problem with this is that human beings manifest these traits
over time and these traits also tend to fade over time. It, also, is not entirely
clear that other things that we are rightly reluctant to call "persons" do not
have some of these traits as well - higher mammals, super-sophisticated
computers, etc. I do not believe that our reluctance to call these other
things "persons" is based in "speciesism" 20 nor do I think that we ought to
ever defend speciesism. Rather I think that this intuition is based on our
knowledge - at some level - that we, human beings, are significantly
different than these other things. How are we different? We were designed
by God in such a way that we are fundamentally different from everything
else in His creation.
The traits that we associate with "personhood" are simply
characteristics that human beings are supposed - were designed, by God to have. By virtue of being a human being, these traits ought to be present
or to develop in the individual. It is a mistake to speak of human beings as
if they were ever other than "persons". When speaking of a pre-born
human being or a small child as a "potential person" it is more proper to
say that these human beings have the potential to manifest X, Y and Z
personhood traits. When there is a situation, such as a mentally retarded
human being, where it seems impossible for the individual to develop these
traits, it is proper to say that the individual suffers a privation - something
that ought to be present, according to God's design, is absent- not to say
that the congenitally retarded child is not a person.
It makes little to no sense to determine an individual's moral status
based on species membership or the manifestation of traits. All human
beings are morally significant, deserving of the highest degree of
protection, and requiring of the highest responsibility from others to
provide necessary aid, whether or not they manifest the traits commonly
associated with "personhood". The reason does not lie in some preference
of a biological class, it lies in the fact that part of the design with which
human beings have been endowed by God is that we are of the highest
moral significance. In other words, we are not morally significant because
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of our species or the manifestation of certain personhood traits, but
because God designed us so to be.
This is not to say that animals are morally irrelevant. If we accept the
Divine design account it does not imply that human beings are the only
things with any moral status in the universe. Clearly, animals are the kinds
of things that we ought to treat responsibly; they have some moral
significance. Therefore, torturing animals or experimenting on them
frivolously- for example: for the purposes of developing cosmetics- is
morally wrong. However, it is ridiculous to say that animals ever have the
same moral status as human beings and that it is thus never morally
acceptable to kill, experiment upon, or utilize them in any way.
Certainly, there will be some who reject this account because God is
involved. However, if there were individuals who did not believe in the
number 3, that state of affairs would not change the proper answer to the
equation 1+2 and it would be ridiculous to drop the correct answer because
of their disbelief. Commonsense ethics require a divine foundation. In
order to maintain our most deeply held intuitions, adopting a supernatural
ontology is absolutely necessary. The alternative is to give up our notions
of health, disease and proper function, not to mention our deeply
entrenched beliefs about our responsibility regarding infants and
cognitively impaired human beingsY
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